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ABSTRACT
This article examines Russia-GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) cooperation in 
the fi eld of anti-corruption policies by looking at the case of regulating state and municipal 
service. By looking at Recommendations and Evaluation Reports, the article seeks to explore 
the impact of GRECO on domestic norms in Russia. The question of disciplinary liability is 
examined further as one of the contentious points in Russia-GRECO interaction. While there 
is extensive literature on corruption in Russia and post-Soviet states, research on Russia’s 
interaction with international organizations in this area is scarce. We hope to contribute to 
the existing research on international cooperation in the global fi ght against corruption, and 
to literature on states’ interaction with (regional) international organizations with a view 
of post-Communist context. The article concludes that even if progress in the fi eld of an-
ti-corruption struggle has been slow, certain achievements must be noted, namely Russian 
anti-corruption laws and their implementation. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The question of the impact of international law on domestic law is hardly a 
new topic for international law scholars. Much research has been done on the 
question of Russia’s application and interpretation of international law.1 In this 
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article we attempt to explore Russia’s cooperation with the Council of Europe 
in the fi eld of anti-corruption measures in the context of Russia’s participation 
in GRECO, a topic that has not been suffi ciently addressed in literature. While 
it is undeniable that Russia’s interaction with the Council of Europe has been 
rather diffi cult, in the fi eld of anti-corruption cooperation Russia has demon-
strated a degree of success, albeit moderate, by accepting GRECO’s recom-
mendations and coordinating its domestic laws with European standards. 
Looking at the specifi c case of regulation of the state civil and municipal ser-
vice, we seek to demonstrate that in Russia, although much remains to be done, 
some progress has been achieved with the adoption of the Federal Law ‘On 
Combating Corruption’, ‘On State Civil Service’ and ‘On Municipal Service’ 
and amendments to the Labor Code and the Criminal Code. 
Anti-corruption measures were declared a priority with a new anti-corrup-
tion plan adopted in April 2016, and represent an important part of domestic 
policy-making. Corruption was often raised in visa liberalization talks be-
tween Russia and the European Union, when the latter required from Russia 
the adoption of measures aimed at regulating document security, migration, 
public security and anti-corruption, and human rights (related to the freedom 
of movement).2 The 2014 events resulted in the sanctions war and normative 
clashes with European countries and the United States and stalled the visa 
liberalization process. Europe, however, remains an important part of Russia’s 
foreign policy. Thus, Russia cannot afford to step out of the anti-corruption 
regime and adopt a confrontationist stance against the Council of Europe in 
this fi eld. Even if progress is rather slow (only 3% of Russian respondents 
polled in 2013 believed that corruption decreased a lot (as compared to 37% 
who thought that it increased a lot),3 the anti-corruption measures will contin-
ue to be translated into domestic law, as the example with state and municipal 
employees which we consider below, shows. 
2.  INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRUGGLE:
TOWARDS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION REGIME?
Corruption, an age-old phenomenon, has been on the international agenda for 
decades. Hazardous effects of corruption have been mentioned in the recent 
2 First Commission report on the implementation by Russia of the Common Steps for visa 
free-regime with the EU (18 December 2013), EU Press Release. Brussels, <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-13-1295_en.htm>, last accessed on 04/04/2017. 
3 Global Corruption Barometer. Transparency International (2013), <http://www.transparen-
cy.org/gcb2013/country/?country=russia>, last accessed on 03/04/2017.
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study by the European Parliament, where it was estimated that, ‘the lack of EU-
wide action against organized crime and corruption costs the EU at least €71 
billion each year’.4 The growth of international treaties relating to corruption 
took place in the 1990s and was largely attributed to the end of the Cold War 
when in the global context of debates over democratization trajectories it was 
no longer politically wise to support corrupt regimes. Anti-corruption struggle 
was also spurred by the necessity to regulate international trade, hindered by 
corrupt practices of states and/or multinational corporations. While Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) adopted in the United States in 1977 because 
of a number of scandals involving business practices of multinationals became 
an example of ‘modern, more global battle’,5 a truly global regime started to 
form a few decades later in the framework of multilateral cooperation within 
international institutions. Thus, a number of international and regional treaties 
emerged, among which were the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Offi cials in International Business Transactions (1997, entered 
into force in 1999), Council of Europe Criminal Convention on Corruption 
(1998, entered into force in 2002) and Additional Protocol (2003, entered into 
force in 2005), and Civil Law Convention on Corruption (1999, entered into 
force in 2003). The United Nations Convention against corruption (UNCAC) 
(2003, entered into force in 2005) became the fi rst universal anti-corruption 
instrument, ratifi ed by 177 states. The UNCAC regulates international coop-
eration in fi ve main areas: prevention, criminalization and law enforcement 
measures, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance 
and information exchange. Corruption was conceptualized not only as a threat 
to institution-building, ethical values, democracy and justice (UNCAC Pre-
amble) but also as an impediment to sustainable development, a facilitating 
factor in the spread of wildlife traffi cking and terrorism (Global fi ght…2015). 
Among the regional initiatives there are Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption (IACAC), and African Union Convention on Preventing and Com-
bating Corruption. 
International fi nancial institutions also took part in this effort against ‘the can-
cer of corruption’, in the words of James D. Wolfensohn, World Bank President 
(1995-2005), who, in his Annual Address of 1996 stressed that, ‘the Bank 
Group will not tolerate corruption in the programs that we support; and we 
are taking steps to ensure that our own activities continue to meet the highest 
4 Maurice, E., Corruption costs EU €71bn a year, EU Observer (23 March 2016), <https://
euobserver.com/justice/132784>, last accessed 04/04/2017. 
5 Bonime-Blanc, A. The Fight Against Corruption Goes Global, Foreign Affairs (February 
14, 2012), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012-02-14/fi ght-against-corruption-goes-
global>, last accessed 04/04/2017. 
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standards of probity’.6 World Bank maintains its Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators, where one of the six dimensions of governance is control of corruption 
(WGI Project). IMF also framed its anti-corruption stance in terms of ‘good 
governance’ and linked the provision of loans to anti-corruption policies.7 It 
encourages states to disseminate information about economics and fi nance 
among the public through its Special Data Dissemination Standard.
Regional European initiatives, apart from the CoE Criminal and Civil Law 
Conventions, include EU anti-corruption legislation, such as the Convention 
on the protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests and Eu-
ropean Union Convention against Corruption Involving Offi cials. Even if the 
European Union has not been as visible as the Council of Europe in this an-
ti-corruption struggle, it certainly played an important role in the context of 
transition of Central and Eastern European states from post-Communism to 
democracy. On the global scale, if we speak about Russia, Corruption Percep-
tion Index (CPI) by Transparency International shows that Russia falls into 
“the largest group of countries, encompassing 5.2 billion people or 72% of the 
world”, alongside with China, India, many South-East Asian states, Africa, 
and some states of Latin America.8 While these fi gures certainly raise ques-
tions as to the effectiveness of this regime and its global implications, it goes 
without saying that the spread of international norms and prohibitions has an 
impact on domestic law-making, as the case of Russia shows.
3.  CONCEPTUALIZING CORRUPTION: RUSSIA’S POST-
COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 
There is extensive literature that explores Russia and other post-Commu-
nist states in their effort to combat corruption.9 Although more than twenty 
years have passed since the collapse of communism, researchers note very 
slow progress of states in this fi eld. Russia, with its rather uneven process 
of transition and tempestuous relations with Europe has been a much more 
6 Annual Meetings Address by James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, 
(1 October 1996). <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGA-
NIZATION/EXTPRESIDENT/EXTPASTPRESIDENTS/PRESIDENTEXTERNAL/0,,con-
tentMDK:20025269~menuPK:232083~pagePK:159837~piPK:159808~theSitePK:227585,00.
html>, last accessed 03/04/2017. 
7 The IMF and Good Governance. Factsheet (14 March 2016), <http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/exr/facts/gov.htm>, last accessed 04/04/2017.  
8 Warf, B., Global Geographies of Corruption, GeoJournal Vol. 1 (13), 04 June 2015. 
9 Holmes, L., Corruption and the Crisis of the Post-Communist State, Crime, Law & Social 
Change, Vo. 27, 1997, p. 275-297.
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diffi cult participant in the global anti-corruption struggle. Especially this is 
true in the context of Russia’s relations with the Council of Europe, which it 
joined in 1996. Why Russia has been a latecomer in this global anti-corrup-
tion regime is subject to further research, but several historical points deserve 
to be mentioned: in Soviet Russia corruption was conceptualized as a bour-
geois phenomenon. The Criminal Code of RSFSR (1922), however, envisaged 
criminal liability for bribery.10 During the political purges of the 1930s and 
during WWII, corruption-related offenses were severely punished and largely 
silenced, which was also true for the time of Kruschev’s ‘thaw’ and Brezhnev’s 
‘stagnation’, since corruption cast a negative light on the Communist Party and 
the Soviet leadership. It was in the late 1980s-early 1990s, in the aftermath of 
perestroika, the dissolution of the USSR, and large-scale privatization, when 
a new kleptocratic oligarchy stratum was formed, that corruption clearly be-
came not only a country-wide evil, but a threat to the very existence of the state 
and the society.11 Researchers point out that corruption has generated a multi-
plicity of hazardous effects in various spheres of life, from banking sector,12 to 
law enforcement,13 and education.14 While the phenomenon of corrupt elites is 
certainly not typical just for Russia, in Russia the Gini coeffi cient (that ranges 
from 0 when almost everybody in the country has similar income to 1 with 
serious income inequalities) comprised 0.45, much higher than in other CEE 
states and comparable to the Third World countries.15  
Post-Soviet Russia has become a party to several anti-corruption treaties. An-
10 Polyakov, M. M., Protivodejstvie korrupcii sovetskimi organami prokuratury v sisteme 
gosudarstvennoj vlasti,  Izvestija TulGU, Vol. 1 (2) Jekonomicheskie i juridicheskie nauki, 
2013, [‘Counteracting Corruption by Prosecutor’s Offi ces in the System of State Power’, Tula 
State University Herald: Economic and Legal Studies],  <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/pro-
tivodeystvie-korruptsii-sovetskimi-organami-prokuratury-v-sisteme-gosudarstvennoy-vlasti>, 
last accessed 04/04/2017. 
11 Hillstrom, B. Effects of Corruption on Democracies in Asia, Latin America, and Russia, 
The Woodrow Wilson Center Report, Vol. 8 (3) 2006, p. 29-30. 
12 Weill, L., How Corruption Affects Bank Lending in Russia, Economic Systems Vol. 35 
(2), 2011.  WGI Project, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>, last 
accessed 04/04/2017. 
13 Gerber, T., Mendelson, S. E., Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in 
Contemporary Russia: a Case of Predatory Policing?, Law and Society Review Vol. 42 (1), 
2008, pp. 1-44.  
14 Nemtsova, A. In Russia, Corruption Plagues the Higher-Education System, Chronicle 
of Higher Education Vol. 54 (24), 2008, <http://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ788930>, last accessed 
04/04/2017. 
15 Berend, I.T., Bugaric, B. Unfi nished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 50 (4), 2015, p. 768-785, 
at 72. 
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ti-corruption efforts were speeded up after Russia signed (2003) and ratifi ed 
(2006) the United Nation Convention against Corruption, followed by CoE 
Criminal Convention on Corruption (2007) and OECD Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi cials in International Business Transac-
tions (signed on in February 2012 and ratifi ed in April the same year). 
The CoE Criminal  Convention on Corruption, while adhering to a more re-
strictive defi nition of corruption than the UNCAC, emphasizes that ‘corrup-
tion threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines good 
governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders econom-
ic development and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and the 
moral foundations of society’ (Preamble). GRECO (a group of states against 
corruption) was set up in 1999 and included Council of Europe member states 
and the USA. Russia made a decision to join this group in February 2007 
by declaring its commitment to create ‘a common European legal space to 
protect individuals from modern-day challenges’.16 It also signed and ratifi ed 
the Criminal Convention on Corruption without reservations and agreed to 
participate in GRECO’s activities, which include regularly evaluation process. 
Russia also cooperated with the CoE in the framework of RUCOLA 2, a proj-
ect aimed at developing anti-corruption legislation, which involved the State 
Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament. Why Russia chose to join 
this group is subject to debate but it is important to bear in mind that an-
ti-corruption strategies remain an important point in Russia’s interaction with 
European countries. 
After joining GRECO, Russia adopted its Federal Law ‘On Combating Corruption’ 
(25 December 2008) N 273-FZ, which has become the core law in the overall 
anti-corruption struggle. This law has been amended twelve times since then, 
and as a consequence, led to the tougher criminal, administrative and disci-
plinary liability for corruption-related offenses. What was also introduced was 
the obligation of the Prosecutor’s Offi ce on the federal level and in the subjects 
of the federation to make their monitoring reports on the implementation of 
the Federal Law pubic, to raise awareness of the problem.    
According to Article 1 of the Federal Law ‘On Combating Corruption’, cor-
ruption is conceptualized as ‘abuse of offi cial position, giving a bribe, receiv-
ing a bribe, abuse of powers, a commercial graft or any other illegal use of 
his/her offi cial position by an individual contrary to the legal interests of the 
society and state in order to receive profi t or benefi t in the form of money, valu-
16 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement, Council of Europe Press Release (1 Febru-
ary 2007),  <https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/news/News2007/News(20070201)
PressReleaseRussia44thmember_en.asp>, last accessed 04/04/2017. 
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ables, other property and services of property nature, other property rights for 
himself/herself or for the third persons or illegal presenting of such advantage 
to the above mentioned person by other individuals as well as committing the 
above mentioned actions on behalf or in the interests of a legal entity.’ In the 
same Article it is specifi ed that anti-corruption refers to the activities of federal 
authorities, authorities of the subjects of the Federation, local authorities, civil 
society, individuals and legal persons, aimed at: 
1. preventing corruption, including the identifi cation and subsequent elimina-
tion of the causes of corruption (corruption prevention);
2. identifying, preventing, suppressing, detecting and investigating corruption 
offenses (anti-corruption);
3. minimizing and (or) liquidating the consequences of corruption offenses.
 On the basis of Article 3 of the Federal Law «On Combating Corruption» 
fi ght against corruption in the Russian Federation is based on the following 
principles:
1. recognition, promotion and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
of man and citizen;
2. legality;
3. publicity and openness of activities of state bodies and local self-govern-
ment;
4. the inevitability of punishment for corruption offenses;
5. the use of political, institutional, outreach, social, economic, legal, special 
and other measures;
6. priority to the preventive measures; 
7. cooperation between the state and civil society institutions, international 
organizations and individuals.
While this defi nition has been criticized by GRECO as will be noted below, it 
remains the most detailed defi nition so far adopted in post-Soviet Russia.  
4. RUSSIA-GRECO INTERACTION IN THE FIELD OF ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICIES:
REGULATING STATE AND MUNICIPAL SERVICE
According to the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 
(2013), the respondents in Russia named public offi cials and civil servants as 
corrupt/extremely corrupt (92%), followed by the police (89%), the judiciary 
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(84%) and the parliament and legislature (83%).17 Thus, anti-corruption mea-
sures, especially in the fi eld of regulating civil service, remain an important 
dimension of domestic anti-corruption policy. 
Examining the area of anti-corruption measures in the fi eld of civil/municipal 
service is important also because state and municipal employment represents 
one of the most contentious issues in Russia-GRECO relations. 
Several contentious points must be mentioned in Russia-GRECO relations. One 
of such points is the various forms of liability envisaged for corruption. GRE-
CO has expressed its concern that ‘the existence of parallel criminal and ad-
ministrative systems afforded opportunities for manipulation, for example, the 
escape from the justice process’.18 GRECO was concerned that article 13 of the 
Law ‘On Combating Corruption’ remained unchanged: it provides that persons 
who commit crimes of corruption can be subjected not only criminal, but also 
administrative or civil liability procedure for corruption. From this it was con-
cluded that the general defi nition of corruption contained in the Law № 273-FZ, 
might not play a decisive role in the choice of the criminal or administrative 
proceedings, and even though in theory the criminal proceedings were given 
priority, the existence of two parallel procedures regarding crimes of corruption 
provided opportunities for manipulation. GRECO recommended administrative 
governance reforms aimed at fi ghting corruption, which would apply to a large 
number of civil servants, and not only to a narrow category of public servants.
GRECO recommended reviewing the system of administrative procedures and 
criminal proceedings with a view to ensure that corruption cases were treated 
as criminal offenses. In particular, it was proposed that a new anti-corrup-
tion principle was added to enable a clear distinction between administrative 
and criminal offenses. The proposal suggested that the provision which would 
make corruption a criminal offense is added.  The authorities claim that the 
introduction of this new principle would facilitate a more clear distinction be-
tween administrative and criminal liability for crimes of corruption and would 
ensure that the perpetrators of corruption were prosecuted primarily on the 
basis of the Criminal Code. This proposal was approved by the Ministry of 
Justice in late 2011, and sent to the State Duma by the General Prosecutor’s 
Offi ce. However, the necessary changes to the law ‘On Combating Corruption’ 
have not been introduced yet. 
17 Global Corruption Barometer. 2013. <https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013>, last ac-
cessed 06/06/2017. 
18 GRECO Third Evaluation Report (22 March 2012), <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitor-
ing/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3(2011)6_RussianFed_One_EN.pdf>, last accessed 
04/04/2017. 
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Thus, GRECO recommends treating corruption-related offenses fi rst and fore-
most as criminal offenses. Russia, however, believes that, the administrative 
procedure applies only in those cases where it is impossible to apply the crim-
inal one. Even if disciplinary liability does not rule out other forms of liabili-
ty, including administrative and criminal one, necessary changes in domestic 
laws have not yet been made. 
In its Addendum to the Compliance Report on Russia from 3-7 December 
2012 GRECO emphasizes that recommendations have been ‘partly imple-
mented’ (Addendum, 2012, 5). In the same document GRECO adds, however, 
that “a number of legislative reforms remain to be completed” (Addendum, 
2013, 132), in particular, in the fi eld of planned amendments to the law “On 
Combating Corruption” (to ensure that acts of corruption are to be considered, 
as a main rule, as criminal offenses), amendments to the Russian Criminal 
Code, which should include provisions to enable confi scation of proceeds from 
all corruption offenses and to the Civil Code (prohibiting gifs within the public 
administration).
A very sensitive issue is listed further in the report: the question of public 
offi cials’ immunity (for corruption, inter alia). Moreover, it has also been rec-
ommended to strengthen judicial independence and control over public admin-
istration, the reporting of corruption and protection of whistle-blowers. ‘The 
implementation and monitoring of impact of such measures should continue to 
feature prominently in the national anti-corruption action plans, including by 
ensuring input by civil society’.19
In 2014 during its 64th meeting in Strasbourg, GRECO adopted its Third Eval-
uation Report. It is noted that the big number of recommendations have been 
complied with by the Russian Federation either fully or partially. Two major 
topics were covered by the Evaluation Report: Incriminations and Transpar-
ency of Party Funding (Third Evaluation Report, 2012). Based on GRECO 
recommendations and evaluation report Russia developed draft laws and in-
troduced amendments into existing laws regulating corruption, in particular, 
to the Federal Law ‘On Combating Corruption’. 
In accordance with GRECO recommendations of 23 December 2010, the Pre-
sidium of the Council for Countering Corruption adopted Model Code of Eth-
ics and Professional Conduct for Public Offi cials of the Russian Federation, 
which became the basis for elaborating similar codes for state and municipal 
19 Addendum to the Compliance Report on the Russian Federation.  Joint First and Second 
Evaluation Round.  Greco RC-I/II (2010) 2E (15 March 2013), <https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2(2010)2_RussianFederation_EN.pdf>, at 
132, last accessed 04/04/2017.  
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employees. At the level of the subjects of the Federation, Presidential Decree 
‘On the National Ant-Corruption Plan 2014-2015’ (11 April 2014) regulates 
compliance of legislative acts and executive orders in the anti-corruption fi eld 
with the National Anti-corruption Strategy, increasing public awareness and 
stimulating research. 
According to the General Prosecutor’s Offi ce, in the period of nine months 
of 2014 they received more than 400 complaints.20 Russians are increasingly 
using on-line complaint procedure, which ensures immediate delivery rather 
than postal services which take quite some time. Often complaints relate to 
violations of criminal procedure, and pre-trial investigation of corruption. All 
complaints were examined and measures were taken, according to the offi cial 
web-site of the Offi ce of the Prosecutor-General. 
Prosecutor’s offi ces in the subjects of the Federation are also obliged to conduct 
monitoring and reporting. Violations of anti-corruption laws entail criminal, 
administrative and disciplinary liability. For example, according to the interim 
report of Prosecutor’s offi ce of Sverdlovsk region, in the period of 9 months of 
2015 the main efforts were directed at detection and suppression of violations of 
laws regulating state and municipal service, in the fi eld regulating exploitation 
of state and municipal property, in the fi eld of budgetary affairs, health services, 
housing and communal services, and other fi elds where corruption offenses are 
most common. Thus, in the period of 9 months of 2015 the Prosecutor’s Offi ce 
reported 6123 violations, 627 illegal legislative acts which generated 636 pros-
ecutorial protests (573 acts were amended or annulled as a result), 329 lawsuits 
were directed to the court, 1129 applications were initiated and on the basis of 
them, 1017 public offi cials were subjected to disciplinary liability, 140 warning 
were issues, 457 were subjected to administrative liability and 57 criminal law-
suits began in accordance with Article 37 of Criminal Procedure Code.21
Anti-corruption legislation on the level of the subjects of the Federation has 
been extensive as well. For example, in Tyumen Region, a range of legisla-
tive anti-corruption laws applies: there is a regional anti-corruption plan and a 
Model anti-corruption plan for municipal entities, adopted by the executive de-
cree of Tyumen Region government N 1244 on 23 April 2012, Tyumen Region 
Law of 25 February 2009 N 6 “On Combating Corruption in Tyumen Region”, 
Executive Decree “On Anti-Corruption Expertise of draft laws and other doc-
uments in Tyumen Region with the purpose of identifying clauses that might 
facilitate condition for corruption” (Offi cial portal of Tyumen region). Similar 
20 Offi cial Web-site of the General Prosecutor’s Offi ce, http://genproc.gov.ru/smi/news/gen-
proc/news-464097, last accessed 05/04/2017. 
21 Offi cial Website of Sverdlovsk Region Prosecutor’s Offi ce, <http://prokurat-so.ru/main.
php?id=1741>, last accessed 05/04/2017. 
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laws have been adopted in other subjects of the Federation, for example, ‘On 
Combating Corruption in Sverdlovsk Region’ (2009), ‘On Combating Corrup-
tion in Chelyabinsk Region’ (2009). Regional laws appeared after the Federal 
Law on Combating Corruption (2008) was adopted, thus, before Russia joined 
GRECO, none existed on the regional level.
Thus, even if progress has been slow, GRECO recommendations fi nd their 
way into Russian domestic legal system and are implemented in practice.
5. THE QUESTION OF DISCIPLINARY LIABILITY
OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Disciplinary liability of state and municipal employees has been a contentious 
point in Russia-GRECO relations. We would like to note that it should fi rst of 
all be regarded as a preventive measure in the overall anti-corruption strategy, 
and not as an exclusive form of liability. Several problematic aspects deserve 
clarifi cation, however. To begin with, the question of disciplinary liability of 
state civil and municipal employees entails the necessity of coordinating an-
ti-corruption responsibilities of municipal employees as defi ned by Federal 
law ‘On Combating Corruption’ and the Federal Law ‘On Municipal Service 
in the Russian Federation’ and ‘On State Civil Service’, as well as the necessity 
to specify the peculiarities of ‘moral reprimand’ as applied to state and munic-
ipal employees for violating Model Code on Ethics and Professional Conduct. 
As Article 192 of the Labor Code states, a disciplinary measure can be applied 
if all procedural requirements are met. For disciplinary liability to apply, the 
employee should have committed a disciplinary offense: non-performance or 
inadequate performance of his/her duties. There are three forms of disciplinary 
measures: a) notice; b) reprimand; c) dismissal. When choosing a disciplinary 
measure, the procedural issues must be respected, such as the employee’s writ-
ten statement clarifying the reasons for his/her behavior. A disciplinary mea-
sure must be applied no later than one month since the date when the offense 
was recorded. One disciplinary offense must entail one disciplinary measure. 
Article 57 of the Federal Law ‘On the State Civil Service’ in addition to the 
notice, reprimand and dismissal for a disciplinary offense provides for the 
possibility of imposing on a state civil servant another form of disciplinary 
liability in the form of a warning. This warning means that the offi cial does 
not fully meet the requirements of his/her position.  
Recommendation xx by GRECO suggests ‘to review the current measures 
designed to prevent confl icts of interest in order to clarify their scope of ap-
plication in respect of public offi cials and their relatives, to remedy the short-
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comings identifi ed and to ensure that the necessary measures are fully imple-
mented in practice’.22 This recommendation was listed as partly implemented. 
Several problems persist, namely, weak control mechanisms. According to the 
Russian authorities’ report, in the Federal Law ‘On amendments made in some 
legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection with promoting state 
management in the area of combating corruption’ (N329-FZ) of 21 November 
2011, ‘loss of trust’ was introduced among the grounds for dismissal of a state 
or municipal employee if s/he is not able to take preventive action against con-
fl ict of interest (including those which arise in respect of his/her subordinates). 
In the Anti-Corruption Plan for 2012-2013 it was mentioned that the Presidium 
of the Council for Counteracting Corruption and the federal state bodies had 
the competence to detect confl icts of interest. The procedure for settling con-
fl icts of interests was outlined in the Presidential Decree No. 233 (25 February 
2011).  Presidential Decree ‘On Commissions for controlling compliance with 
the requirements of service conduct by federal public offi cials and the settling 
of confl icts of interest’ (No. 821) (1 July 2010) enabled the establishment of 
special commissions, and GRECO notes that, ‘such commissions have been 
established by all federal public authorities and 3 416 commissions have been 
set up by the authorities’ territorial bodies,’ and 2788 public offi cials were sub-
jected to disciplinary liability in 2010-2011 (4.4 times increase) (Addendum, 
2013, 94). Ministry of Labor and Social Protection was charged with monitor-
ing the commissions’ activities. 
According to Article 27.1 of the Federal Law ‘On Municipal Service in the 
Russian Federation’, municipal employees may be subject to disciplinary lia-
bility to violating anti-corruption laws. Such can be the case when there are 
instances of violating laws regulating confl ict of interest (Article 14.1), as well 
as non-disclosure of information relating to income, expenses, property and 
non-material responsibilities (Article 15).  
Article 59.2 of the Federal Law ‘On State Civil Service in the Russian Fed-
eration’ mentions broader grounds for dismissal of state civil employees. In 
the fi eld of state civil service, the Federal Law stipulates (Article 19) that civil 
employees may be dismissed in cases of failure of a civil servant, being party 
to a confl ict of interest, to take preventive measures or resolve a confl ict of 
interest; failure to submit information on his/her income and property-related 
obligations, participation of a state civil employee in management of a com-
mercial organization, except in cases stipulated by Federal Law; entrepreneur-
22 Addendum to the Compliance Report on the Russian Federation.  Joint First and Second 
Evaluation Round.  Greco RC-I/II (2010) 2E (15 March 2013), <https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2(2010)2_RussianFederation_EN.pdf>, at 
91, last accessed 05/04/2017. 
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ial activities of a state civil employee; participation of a state civil employee in 
management/board of governance of non-governmental organizations (unless 
stipulated by an international treaty or domestic law). Representative of an 
employer would be subject for dismissal if s/he was aware of the confl ict of 
interest but failed to take measures to prevent or solve it.   
The Law ‘On Combating Corruption’ lists several main responsibilities of state/
municipal employees to comply with anti-corruption laws: Article 8 lists the 
obligation to submit the information about their income, property and property 
obligations, as well as the income, property and property obligations of their 
spouse and underage children, Article 9 talks about the liability to report to 
the employer/the Prosecutor’s offi ce or other state institutions of attempts to 
induce him/her to commit corruption offenses, Article 11 - the obligation to 
take measures to prevent any possibility of a confl ict of interests.
GRECO recommended developing and publishing the model code of conduct 
/ ethics for civil servants / offi cials, including state servants, which could be 
adapted to the specifi c needs of the various sectors of the state apparatus. 
On 23 December 2010, ‘The Model Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct 
of State Employees of the Russian Federation and the Municipal Employees’ 
(hereinafter the Model Code) was adopted by the Presidium of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Council. The Code is based on universally recognized principles and 
contains general rules of ethics and conduct in accordance with the anti-cor-
ruption law, and it must be followed by the offi cials of the Russian Federation, 
as well as citizens serving in the armed forces and law enforcement agencies. 
In the process of drafting the code, similar codes of the conduct of judges, law 
enforcement offi cers, auditors, lawyers / attorneys were taken into account. 
The Code is aimed at regulating the standards of professional conduct and 
ethics, at the provision of assistance to the offi cials in the observance of these 
rules, and at informing the public about the behavior which is to be expected 
from offi cials. Following the adoption of the Model Code, similar codes were 
drafted in 55 federal bodies.  
In paragraphs 26-27 of the Model Code it is noted that a state/municipal em-
ployee should refrain from: 
1. any kind of statements and actions which are discriminatory on the grounds 
of sex, age, race, nationality, language, nationality, social status, wealth or 
marital status, political or religious preferences;
2. rudeness, contemptuous behavior, arrogant, prejudiced comments, making 
illegal, unfair accusations;
3. threats, abusive language or remarks, actions that prevent normal commu-
nication or provoke illegal behavior;
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4. smoking during business meetings, interviews, other offi cial meetings with 
the citizens.
6. CONCLUSION
The system of legal regulation of anti-corruption measures is being formed 
in Russia with a signifi cant impact of GRECO recommendations. Unresolved 
issues, related, fi rst of all, to the insistence by GRECO that corruption offenses 
should be treated as criminal offenses, and the question of immunity, as well 
as confl ict-of-interest prevention, persist. However, various forms of liability 
currently envisaged in Russia (administrative and civil) do not exclude the pos-
sibility of criminal prosecution. International norms and the GRECO recom-
mendations in particular, have a strong infl uence on domestic law-making and 
subsequent implementation. 
As far as practical recommendations are concerned, we believe it is important 
to introduce changes to Articles 27 and 27.1 of the law ‘On Municipal Service 
in the Russian Federation’ and Articles 57 and 59.2 of the law ‘On State Civil 
Service in the Russian Federation’, which would enable to unify the types of 
disciplinary penalties and the grounds for dismissal of municipal and state 
employees for corruption-related offenses. It also is important to address such 
problematic issues as the legal status of moral reprimand and legal conse-
quences of its application. 
As Berend and Bugaric correctly note, for the process of transition to work, 
there should be not only free market, enterprise and foreign direct investment, 
but also social-behavioral-moral transformation.23 This is especially relevant 
in the context of corruption, since in CEE states, including Russia, corruption 
is frequently perceived by the business elite and the public at large as a way to 
solve problems. Existence of various shadow networks which function along-
side state institutions, undermines state security,24 and leads to the lack of trust 
on the part of the population in the capacities of the state. Transition, however, 
cannot come overnight. Even if implementation of anti-corruption measures 
appears to be uneven, the modest achievements of the past years offer reasons 
to hope.   
23 Berend, I.T., Bugaric, B. Unfi nished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 50 (4), 2015, p.768-785, 
at 785.
24 Nechaev, M. A. O roli gosudarstva v protivodejstvii korrupcii: pravovye aspekty, Juridi-
cheskaja nauka, 1, 2013. [‘On the Role of the State in Combating Corruption: Legal Aspects’, 
Legal Studies], <cyberleninka.ru/article/n/o-roli-gosudarstva-v-protivodeystvii-korruptsii- 
pravovye-aspekty>, last accessed 14.05.2017.
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